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Abstract  
While natural gas exports have brought a large amount of foreign currency revenue 
to the Government of Myanmar, their contribution to reducing monetization of the 
fiscal deficit and disinflation has been obscure. The immediate reason is that under 
the country’s dual exchange rate system, the revenue is converted at the grossly 
overvalued official rate which undervalues it in terms of the local currency by 1/200. 
However, devaluation would only improve the fiscal balance and not reduce the 
excess money supply since the central bank cannot sterilize the impact of the foreign 
reserve increase. As a policy reform to utilize the revenue for disinflation, this study 
proposes deregulation of the strict controls on foreign exchange. 
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Natural Gas Export Revenue, Fiscal Balance and Inflation in Myanmar1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since 2002 natural gas exports have brought a large amount of foreign currency revenue 
to the Government of Myanmar. In fiscal year 2007-20082 , natural gas exports 
amounted to USD 2.5 billion, which accounted for 40 percent of total exports. When 
converted into the local currency at the prevailing parallel market exchange rate, this 
revenue amounted to 12.4 percent of Myanmar’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)3. 
The chronic fiscal deficit and high inflation due to monetization of the fiscal 
deficit have been ingrained problems in Myanmar. Monetization of the fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of GDP averaged over four percent in the early 2000s, and inflation ran as 
high as 58 percent per annum in 2002-2003. The large revenue from natural gas exports 
is expected to consolidate the fiscal balance and contribute to macroeconomic 
stabilization. However, there have been less pronounced changes in the monetization of 
the fiscal deficit, and the inflation rate for 2008-2009 remained 22.9 percent per annum. 
Superficially, two things account for the scant impact of gas revenue on 
macroeconomic stabilization. First, as noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(2007:8), under the dual exchange rate system the government applies the grossly 
overvalued official rate for the conversion of foreign currency revenues into the kyat 
local currency. As of the end of 2009, the official exchange rate was approximately 5 
kyat’s per US dollar, whereas the prevailing parallel market rate was around 1,000 
kyat’s per US dollar. Thus, valuating the foreign exchange surplus at the official 
exchange rate undervalues it by one to two hundred (1/200). Second, there is a 
considerable drain of gas revenue via two channels: one is payments to foreign 
stakeholders, and the other is unrecorded transactions that are represented by ‘Net 
Errors and Omissions’ in the balance of payments statistics. Still, the accumulation of 
foreign reserves has been robust, and the increase of foreign reserves in 2007-2008 
amounted to over USD 1 billion, which was equivalent to 5 percent of GDP.  
                                                  
1  The author would like to thank Konosuke Odaka, Fumiharu Mieno, Masahiro 
Kodama, and Kozo Kunimune for valuable discussion. 
2 The fiscal year in Myanmar is from April 1 to March 31.  
3 Official statistics report the value of exports in kyat. For the conversion here, the export value of 
natural gas was first converted into US dollar at the official exchange rate, then re-converted into 
kyat at the prevailing market exchange rate. As of the end of March 2008, the market exchange rate 
was 1,111 kyat/US dollar, and Myanmar’s nominal GDP for 2007-2008 was Kyat 22,683.5 billion. 
As of writing this paper (March 2010), GDP data from fiscal year 2008-2009 were not available. 
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However, if the question is whether applying the market exchange rate resolves 
the obscure contribution of gas revenue to disinflation, the answer is no. Applying the 
market exchange rate for the conversion of gas revenue would certainly reduce the 
fiscal deficit. However, without complementary sterilization, it is accompanied by a 
proportional increase in the money supply, which in turn exerts inflationary pressure on 
the price level. With Myanmar’s underdeveloped financial system, the monetary 
authority cannot conduct sterilization operations. 
Furthermore, as will be described, the strict controls on foreign exchange 
aggravate the limited usage of gas revenue for stabilization. Such controls are a legacy 
from the period when the government was struggling with a shortage of foreign 
exchange. Their function has been to pool the foreign exchange available to the 
government; however, their side effects have been to increase the kyat expenditures of 
the government and hamper the absorption of kyat liquidity from the private sector. 
Given that natural gas exports have drastically improved the foreign exchange position 
of the government, strict controls on foreign exchange have become obsolete, and they 
do more harm than good even for the government in terms of macroeconomic 
management. 
This paper explores measures for using the revenue from natural gas exports for 
macroeconomic stabilization, in particular, disinflation. It will be shown first that while 
devaluating the overvalued official exchange rate cuts the fiscal deficit and alleviates 
the monetization, it does not contain the excess money supply unless accompanied by 
sterilization of the large export revenue. The paper then points out where the strict 
controls on foreign exchange aggravate and limit the usage of gas revenue for 
disinflation. Lastly it will prescribe policy reform in order to make full use of gas 
revenue for disinflation. It is the contribution of this paper to synthesize the facts about 
the recent developments in natural gas exports, macroeconomic management, and 
foreign exchange regulations in Myanmar for policy analyses. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 assesses the impact of natural 
gas export revenue on the monetization of the fiscal deficit and inflation. Section 3 
describes the interrelationship of export revenues, fiscal balance, and the money supply 
with the accounting identities of the government and the central bank. The section will 
show that since sterilization is not an available policy option, the excess money supply 
remains regardless of official exchange rate devaluation. Section 4 argues that the strict 
controls on foreign exchange, while pooling foreign exchange to the government, limits 
the capacity of the government to use the gas revenue for containing the excess supply 
of money. Section 5 sets forth prescriptions for policy reform to make use of the gas 
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revenue for macroeconomic stabilization. Such policy reform includes a change in the 
budget allocation system of the public sector and current account liberalization. Section 
6 will summarize the analyses of this study and offer some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Impact of Natural Gas Revenue on Fiscal Balance and Inflation 
 
2.1 Export revenues, drainage, and foreign reserves 
Full-scale production and export of natural gas was achieved by 2002, and it has 
become Myanmar’s largest export item. The rise in natural gas exports has been 
impressive. It was virtually nil in 1998-1999, and rose to account for 40 percent of total 
exports within ten years, with an export value of USD 2.5 billion in 2007-2008. When 
converted into the local currency at the prevailing market exchange rate, this natural gas 
export revenue amounted to 12.4 percent of GDP in 2007-20084. 
FIGURE 1 summarizes the indices of Myanmar’s balance of payments. The 
country used to suffer from trade deficits in the 1990s which led the government to opt 
for strict controls on foreign exchange. Natural gas exports have significantly improved 
the trade balance. Since the public sector monopolizes natural gas exports, the 
expectation would be that these exports have also contributed to fiscal revenues and 
improved the fiscal balance. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
However, not all of the foreign currency revenue from natural gas exports is 
reckoned into the fiscal budget. There are two channels of drainage. One is the 
repatriation of natural gas revenues to foreign stakeholders. Such outflows have 
amounted to between 50 and 70 percent of export revenues in some years (IMF 2006:8). 
Balance of payments statistics categorize such expenditure as income (debit) in the 
current account. In fact, income (debit) has soared from USD 169 million in 2000 to 
USD 1.3 billion in 2006. As can be seen in FIGURE 1, compared with the large surplus 
in the trade balance, the surpluses in the current account and overall balances are not so 
                                                  
4 While natural gas exports have had a substantial impact on Myanmar’s economy, its proved 
reserves and production are not prominent in Southeast Asia. According to the BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy, June 2009, Myanmar’s proved reserves and production are 17.5 trillion cubic ft. (as 
of the end of 2008) and 43.8 billion cft. (for 2008), respectively. For Indonesia the same figures are 
112.5 trillion cft. and 2.46 trillion cft., and for Malaysia 84.3 trillion cft. and 2.2 trillion cft.. This 
comparison suggests that Myanmar’s relatively small-sized economy and poor export performance 
magnify the economic impact of natural gas exports. 
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remarkable. 
The other channel of drainage is unrecorded outflows of foreign exchange, 
represented as ‘Net Errors and Omissions’ (NEO) in the balance of payments statistics. 
FIGURE 2 summarizes the development of NEO along with the changes in foreign 
reserves. NEO has soared considerably since the rise in natural gas exports. It used to be 
around -30 million US dollars, or within three percent of export values from 1996 
through 2002. It jumped to -149 million US dollars (or 4.9 percent of total export) in 
2004, -610 million (16.1 percent) in 2005, and -632 million (13.9 percent) in 2006. The 
negative value of NEO indicates unrecorded outflows of foreign exchange. The 
coincidence of the surge in NEO with the rise in natural gas exports implies that some 
portion of natural gas revenue has been directed to unrecorded imports by the 
government, or it was transferred to the private sector through unrecorded transactions5. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Notwithstanding the drainage of foreign exchange through the two 
above-mentioned channels, foreign reserve accumulation has been robust. In 2007-2008 
foreign reserves rose from USD 2.35 billion to USD 3.52 billion, an increase of USD 
1.07 billion. This growth of foreign reserves, if converted at the parallel market 
exchange rate, was equivalent to 5.2 percent of GDP for that fiscal year.  
 
2.2 Developments in the fiscal balance and inflation 
Although the sharp accumulation of foreign reserve implies the foreign currency budget 
of the government has achieved a large surplus, the aggregated fiscal balance in nominal 
terms has remained in deficit. FIGURE 3 summarizes the developments in the fiscal 
balance and financing methods. The fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP has to some 
extent improved from around 4 to 5 percent in the early 2000s to 3 to 4 percent in 
2005-20076. The improvement in the fiscal balance is less pronounced in comparison 
with the robust accumulation of foreign reserve. The immediate reason, as noted by the 
                                                  
5 For public entities with the foreign exchange rationing at the official exchange rate, putting the 
rationing on the parallel market gives substantial private gains. This might be a rationale for the 
government to maintain the dual exchange rate system. In fact, since 2006 kyat has strengthened 
considerably against US dollar in the parallel market. While it is still a subject of a minute 
investigation in the future, the development of the parallel market rate implies an increase in the 
supply of foreign exchange to the market via such an informal channel.   
6 On the basis of an implausible double digit growth rate of GDP for consecutive years, Mya Than 
and Myat Thein (2007) argue that the government has overestimated GDP in recent years. 
Overestimation of GDP would reduce the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP.  
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IMF (2007:8), is that the government valuates the foreign currency surplus at the 
overvalued official exchange rate, which grossly undervalues the gas revenue. 
Meanwhile, the government has financed most of the fiscal deficit by compelling the 
central bank to print money.  
 
FIGURE 3 
 
One can see in the balance sheet of the central bank some traces of the valuation 
of foreign currency at the official exchange rate. TABLE 1 summarizes the balance 
sheet of the central bank. It is due to the valuation of foreign exchange at the overvalued 
official exchange rate that foreign assets are disproportionately small. If foreign assets 
are evaluated at the prevailing market exchange rate as in Line (B) in TABLE 1, these 
assets become the largest item in the assets as of the end 2008. Furthermore, the 
increase in foreign assets surpassed the disbursement of loans to the government in 
2008. Assuming that the increase in the foreign reserves of the central bank matched the 
foreign currency budget surplus of the government and the bulk of the fiscal deficit was 
financed by the central bank loans with printing money, then changing the valuation of 
foreign currency revenues would have eliminated the fiscal deficit completely in 2008. 
In other words, the fiscal balance would have actually been in surplus. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Turning to the developments in the money supply and inflation, these are 
summarized in FIGURE 4. The growth of the currency in circulation rate has shifted 
around 20 percent per annum. This chronically high growth rate of money is resulted 
from the monetization of the fiscal deficit.  
 
FIGURE 4 
 
On the other hand, inflation has exhibited an unsteady trend, and no stable 
relationship can be observed between inflation and money supply in the short run. 
Rather the short-run movement of inflation may be affected by shocks such as the 
collapse of the rice price in 2000, and the banking crisis7 and the subsequent economic 
downturn from 2003. Nonetheless, judging from the experiences of many developing 
countries summarized by Fischer et al. (2002), the present study considers the excess 
                                                  
7 See Turnell (2003) for the chronology of the banking crisis. 
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supply of money as one of the causes for high inflation in the medium to long run in 
Myanmar. In fact, the annual inflation rate exceeded 20 percent in 2007 and 2008 after 
the successive years of high growth in money supply. Thus it can be argued that 
containing the excess money supply is imperative for disinflation in Myanmar. 
 
 
3. Irrelevance of Exchange Rate in the Relationship of Export Revenue to Money 
 
Using the accounting identities of the government and the central bank, this section will 
show that while valuating foreign currency revenue at the parallel market exchange rate 
would cut the fiscal deficit, it would not add to containing the excess money supply and 
to disinflation. As shown below, such inability to make use the natural gas revenue for 
disinflation is due to Myanmar’s underdeveloped financial market where the monetary 
authority cannot conduct open market operations for sterilization of the large export 
revenue. 
As the premise of analysis, three macroeconomic conditions in Myanmar are 
highlighted. First, under the strict controls on foreign exchange, the government 
compels the ministries and State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) with foreign exchange 
revenue to surrender it, and allocates foreign exchange rationing within the public sector 
at the official exchange rate. Thus, the budget of each public entity has been effectively 
separated into a local currency account and a local currency account, and they are not 
interchangeable. 
Second, the underdeveloped financial market does not allow the central bank to 
conduct open market operations. Although the government issues treasury bonds, there 
is no secondary market. Commercial banks purchase the bulk of the treasury bonds and 
hold them until the date of maturity, whereas the central bank does not possess treasury 
bonds or any domestically-issued liquid securities. For the central bank, an alternative 
instrument to absorb excess liquidity is central bank bonds which were used in Thailand 
and Indonesia to cope with large capital flows in the mid 1990s (Corbo and Hernandez 
1996). However, without sufficient demand for such securities from the financial market, 
its application for Myanmar is not feasible. Thus, at present there is scarcely any scope 
for open market operations to absorb kyat liquidity from the market. 
Third, the government finances the fiscal deficit mostly by printing money. Some 
portion of the deficit used to be financed with treasury bonds in 1998 through 2000. 
However, since 2001 the increase in the net sales (sales minus discharged) of treasury 
bonds has been minimal (see FIGURE 3) as the demand for these assets appears to be 
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saturated. The amount of treasury bonds outstanding as of the end of 2007-2008 was 
Kyat 179.8 billion, or just 0.8 percent of GDP. Thus, in the following analysis, it is 
assumed that money printing is the only means for financing the fiscal deficit. 
This analysis also leaves out changes in exchange rate within a period in order to 
concentrate on the impact that changing the valuation of foreign exchange poses on the 
money supply. It is assumed that the government can employ either the overvalued 
official exchange rate or the prevailing parallel market rate. The analysis corresponds to 
a sort of fixed exchange rate regime 
Starting with the description of the government’s fiscal deficit, FD, in terms of 
kyat, this can be expressed as follows: 
 
 ܨܦ ؠ ሺܧܺܵ െ ܴܧܸሻ ൅ ሺܧܺܵ௙ െ ܴܧܸ௙ሻ · ݁ݔ,   (1) 
where REV and EXS refer to revenues and expenditures in the kyat account, while 
ܴܧܸ௙ and ܧܺܵ௙ stand for those in the foreign currency account, respectively. ex is the 
exchange rate of kyat vis-a-vis foreign currency (i.e., US dollar), either the overvalued 
official exchange rate or the prevailing parallel market rate. A negative value of FD 
indicates fiscal surplus. Assuming that the foreign currency account is in surplus, i.e., 
ܴܧܸ௙ ൐ ܧܺܵ௙, we can see that applying the parallel market rate for conversion of the 
foreign currency account cuts the fiscal deficit. 
Next is a description of the accounting identity of the central bank, expressed as 
follows: 
 
 ∆ܯ ؠ ∆ܴ · ݁ݔ ൅ ߂ܤ ൅ ∆ܮ௚ ൅ ∆ܮ௕,    (2) 
where the left-hand side of the identity refers to changes in liabilities; M denotes reserve 
money, and ߂ stands for a change in each term. The right-hand side refers to changes 
in assets; R denotes foreign reserves and B local currency-denominated securities. ܮ௚ 
and ܮ௕ are credits (net) to the government and commercial banks. This is a standard 
accounting identity of the central bank, as in Agenor and Montiel (1999: 49), except that 
changes in the net worth of the central bank which come from changes in the exchange 
rate within a period and income from interest on assets are omitted. 
In this equation, the sterilization of large export earnings can be seen as offsetting 
the increase in R with reduction in B, which leaves M unchanged. In the context of 
Myanmar, it may be approximated ∆ܤ ൌ ∆ܮ௕ ൌ 0 since the central bank has no liquid 
securities and its credits to commercial banks are very limited. Thus, the conventional 
sterilization operation is not an available policy option in Myanmar. 
Assuming that the government finances the whole fiscal deficit by printing money, 
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߂ܮ௚ ൌ ܨܦ. Substituting this into Equation (2) and rearranging gives 
 
      ߂ܯ ൌ ܨܦ ൅ ߂ܴ · ݁ݔ ൅ ሺ∆ܤ ൅ ∆ܮ௕ሻ.                            (2’) 
Given ∆ܤ ൌ ∆ܮ௕ ൌ 0, changes in money depend entirely on two terms: the fiscal 
deficit and the changes in foreign reserve. 
Applying the market exchange rate for valuation of the foreign currency account 
would reduce FD, which has the effect of containing monetary growth. However, that is 
offset by the amplified impact of ∆ܴ on money. In other words, using the overvalued 
official exchange rate for valuation of the foreign currency account has a sterilization 
effect. While devaluation would cut the fiscal deficit, it eliminates this sterilization 
effect, and expands the money supply which comes from a valuation change in foreign 
reserves in terms of kyat local currency. This leaves the growth rate of money 
unchanged. 
The irrelevance of the exchange rate with money growth can be demonstrated 
more clearly by substituting Equation (1) into Equation (2’) which yields 
 
 ∆ܯ ൌ ሺܧܺܵ െ ܴܧܸሻ ൅ ሾ∆ܴ െ ሺܴܧܸ௙ െ ܧܺܵ௙ሻሿ · ݁ݔ ൅ ሺ∆ܤ ൅ ∆ܮ௕ሻ. (3) 
Under Myanmar’s current strict controls on foreign exchange, the private sector does 
not have access to foreign reserves. Changes in foreign reserves come entirely from the 
government’s foreign currency account balance, so that ∆ܴ ൌ ሺܴܧܸ௙ െ ܧܺܵ௙ሻ. Along 
with the assumption that ∆ܤ ൌ ∆ܮ௕ ൌ 0, Equation (3) can be reduced to  
 
 ∆ܯ ൌ ሺܧܺܵ െ ܴܧܸሻ.      (4) 
Equation (4) is significant as it shows that whatever exchange rate is applied for 
valuation of foreign currency transactions, the money supply is solely determined by the 
kyat account balance of the government. 
 
 
4. Foreign Exchange Policies Hampering Use of Natural Gas Revenue for 
Macroeconomic Stabilization 
 
This section illustrates that Myanmar’s strict controls on foreign exchange have had a 
negative impact on the limited usage of natural gas export revenue for macroeconomic 
stabilization. The government initially implemented the controls in order to secure 
scarce foreign exchange for targeted sectors. These controls have functioned to pool the 
foreign exchange available to the government while saving foreign currency 
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expenditures. Although natural gas exports have significantly improved the 
government’s foreign exchange position, there has not been any conspicuous change in 
the controls. 
There are two features in the controls on foreign exchange. First, within the public 
sector the government rations the foreign exchange budget to ministries and State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate. At the 
same time, public entities having foreign currency revenues are compelled to surrender 
them to the Treasury, and they are not allowed to spend their foreign exchange earnings. 
Thus, the budget for each public entity is divided into a kyat account and a foreign 
currency account. 
Accordingly, even though the public sector as a whole has a surplus in the foreign 
currency account, SEEs with insufficient rations from the foreign currency budget have 
no choice but to procure import goods through domestic private importers using the 
kyat budget. Additional allocations of foreign exchange to such SEEs would save kyat 
expenditures and reduce the excess money supply, but this is inhibited in the current 
budget system. 
The second feature is that the controls do not permit private sector access to 
foreign reserves even for the purpose of current account transactions, not to mention 
capital account transactions. At the same time, private exporters are not compelled to 
surrender their foreign exchange to the government at the official exchange rate. While 
they have to deposit their foreign exchange in foreign currency accounts at state banks 
where a 10 percent export tax is levied, there is de facto government recognition that 
private exporters can dispose of their foreign currency deposits on their own imports or 
transfer them to others at the competitive parallel market rate. As a result, there is a 
segmentation of the foreign exchange market between the public and private sectors8.  
Due to this segmentation of the foreign exchange market, the government cannot 
sell its foreign exchange to the private sector to absorb kyat liquidity. Assuming that 
there would be latent demand in the private sector for imports, and a proportional 
demand for foreign exchange, releasing a part of the government’s foreign reserves for 
private sector imports would help absorb kyat liquidity from the market. 
 
 
5. Policy Reform to Make Use of Natural Gas Revenue for Stabilization 
 
                                                  
8 The segmentation of the foreign exchange market between private and public sectors is well 
documented in Kubo (2007) and Hori and Wong (2008). 
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When considering policy reforms to make full use of natural gas revenue for disinflation, 
reforming the foreign exchange rationing system within the public sector would be 
relatively easy since adjustments would take place within the public sector. By replacing 
the procurement of imports using kyat with procurement using the foreign currency 
budget, the public sector as a whole could cut kyat expenditures which would help 
contain the excess money supply. In terms of Equation (3), an increase in foreign 
currency expenditures does not affect the money supply since ∆ܴ െ ሺܴܧܸ௙ െ ܧܺܵ௙ሻ ൌ
0. On the other hand, a cut in kyat expenditures EXS accompanies a reduction in ∆ܯ. 
Given the current prevailing market exchange rate, replacing one dollar’s worth of 
imports procured from the kyat budget with the procurement from the foreign currency 
budget would reduce 1,000 kyat worth of money growth. 
Are there any side effects of such a reform in foreign exchange rationing within 
the public sector? One of the focal points is whether the reform provides incentives for 
SEEs to demand excessive foreign exchange allocation given the gross disparities 
between the overvalued official rate and the prevailing market exchange rate. Two 
points indicate that the reform probably would not provide such incentives. First, even 
under the current foreign exchange rationing system, the government assesses the 
profit-and-loss performance of the SEEs’ foreign currency transactions not with the 
standard of the overvalued official rate, but with a reference exchange rate close to the 
prevailing market rate9. The government uses the official exchange rate mostly for 
nominal bookkeeping purposes. Second, the SEEs are not operating on a self-paying 
basis; their budgets are integrated under the central government in the State Fund 
Account (SFA). The government introduced the SFA in 1990 to cope with the 
accumulating non-performing loans of the SEEs which were then operating on a 
self-paying basis. Currently the budget deficits of individual SEEs are aggregated in the 
SFA, and the deficit in the SFA is financed through the fiscal budget which in turn is 
financed by printing money. Thus, the profit orientation of the SEEs is not necessarily 
high. 
Permitting private sector access to foreign reserves would be another significant 
reform in order to use natural gas export revenue for macroeconomic stabilization. In 
terms of Equation (3), a reduction in ∆ܴ through sales of foreign reserves to the private 
sector would translate into a proportional reduction in ∆ܯ. By permitting private sector 
access, it would no longer hold that ∆ܴ ൌ ሺܴܧܸ௙ െ ܧܺܵ௙ሻ. Currently, a large portion 
of the natural gas export revenue that is lying idle as foreign reserves at the central bank 
could be allocated to the private sector where it is needed which would absorb kyat 
                                                  
9 Based on author’s interviews with senior staff of SEEs in Yangon, in August 2009. 
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liquidity and thereby help achieve disinflation. However, this reform would require 
thorough consideration of the side effects. 
One practical issue would be the extent of deregulating controls on foreign 
exchange: whether to restrict the access to foreign reserves to current account 
transactions or to also permit capital account transactions. The more comprehensive the 
deregulation of controls, the more would be the demand for foreign reserves, and the 
more the absorption of kyat liquidity from the private sector. However, a more 
comprehensive deregulation might bring about more extensive side effects. 
Lifting the ban on the use of foreign reserves for current account transactions must 
come with deregulation of controls on private imports. Since 1998 the private sector has 
remained subject to a kind of cash budget control on imports. This control, sometimes 
called the Export-First Policy, was initially implemented to cope with the deteriorated 
trade balance at the time. All private sector imports require permission from the 
government, and import licenses are conditional on the proof of export earnings to 
cover import bills. Consequently, importing by the private sector has been repressed as 
shown in TABLE 2 which summarizes developments in the trade balance by ownership. 
The private sector had a large trade deficit in the 1990s. But the growth of this sector’s 
importing has been repressed since the early 2000s, and the trade deficit contained. This 
development can be attributed to the Export-First Policy, which since the mid 2000s the 
government has enforced more tightly. As the private sector’s current demand for 
imports is repressed by the Export-First Policy, simultaneous deregulation of this 
control along with the access to foreign reserves would stimulate a sizable demand for 
imports and the proportionate demand for foreign exchange. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
A simple simulation of the impacts of such reform on the money supply is 
performed, and the results are presented in TABLE 3. The bench mark is the fiscal year 
2007-2008. Lacking the means to predict the extent that policy reform would stimulate 
the private sector’s imports, the simulation here considers three cases where imports 
increase by 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent. Similarly, current account 
liberalization might affect the level of the equilibrium exchange rate. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to predict the equilibrium exchange rate. Therefore the parallel 
market rate as of the end of fiscal year 2007-2008 is used for this simple simulation. 
 
TABLE 3 
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Looking first at the impact of devaluating the official rate to the level of the 
parallel market rate, it would reduce the increase in the money supply that comes from 
the fiscal deficit (FD). In fact, the fiscal balance would be in surplus, which would 
actually cut the money supply. On the other hand, due to the change in foreign reserves 
(∆ܴ) in terms of kyat, the money supply would expand proportionately. In effect, 
devaluation of the official exchange rate would not cause any change in the growth rate 
of the money supply. 
Second, by lifting the ban on foreign reserves for the private sector along with 
deregulating the Export-First Policy, the expected result would be an increase in private 
sector imports. This would alleviate the accumulation of foreign reserves which would 
in turn reduce the growth of the money supply. TABLE 3 shows that a 20 percent 
increase in imports would almost offset the growth of money coming from the gas 
revenue, and that a 30 percent increase would result in a fall in the money supply. These 
results suggest that this combination of policy reforms would be effective in reducing 
the excess money supply. 
On the other hand, liberalization of capital account transactions would require 
more careful consideration. Assessments of the impact of capital account liberalization 
on developing countries are still divided (Edison et al. 2004; Prasad and Rajan 2008). 
In the context of Myanmar, capital account liberalization implies more demand for 
foreign reserves, so that more excess kyat liquidity can be absorbed. However, the 
spread of foreign assets and the associated reduction in the kyat money balance of the 
private sector may have adverse effects on macroeconomic stability through another 
channel. Currently the government relies heavily on ‘inflation tax’ as a source of 
revenue. As the government monetizes the fiscal deficit, printing money dilutes the 
value of the existing money balance, which is actually a transfer of assets from the 
holders of money in the private sector to the issuer of money and the government, what 
is termed the inflation tax. The kyat money balance of the private sector is the tax base 
of this inflation tax. As argued by Giovannini and de Melo (1993), financial 
liberalization and the associated decline in the money balance requires the government 
to find alternative sources of revenue. Similarly, Adam (1995) noted the case of Zambia 
where deregulation of controls on foreign exchange prior to fiscal consolidation led to 
the deterioration of inflation. With Myanmar’s poor track record of fiscal balance, 
capital account liberalization might aggravate inflation; thus such liberalization might 
not yet be a valid option as far as inflation is concerned. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Since 2002 natural gas exports have brought large export revenue to the Government of 
Myanmar, and observers might expect a consolidation of the fiscal balance, easing of 
the monetization of the fiscal deficit, and disinflation. However, the impact of this 
revenue on the fiscal balance and inflation has been obscure. As noted by the IMF 
(2007), one immediate reason is that under the dual exchange rate system, the 
government valuates export revenue at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate. 
This undervalues export revenue in terms of the kyat local currency by approximately 
one to two hundred (1/200).  
However, devaluating the official exchange rate would not solve the problem. 
While it would certainly cut the fiscal deficit sharply, it would lead to a proportional 
increase in the money supply unless accompanied by sterilization. Given Myanmar’s 
underdeveloped financial market, there is scarcely any room for sterilization operations. 
This limits the use of natural gas export revenue for macroeconomic stabilization. 
This paper explored measures to enhance the use of natural gas export revenue for 
disinflation. It pointed out the strict controls on foreign exchange that aggravate the 
limited usage of revenue from natural gas exports. Such controls, initially implemented 
in the 1990s to manage scarce foreign exchange, have worked to pool the foreign 
exchange available to the government. The result in the recent years has been that while 
the public sector as a whole has a surplus of foreign exchange, some public entities with 
an insufficient rationing of foreign exchange for procuring import goods use kyat from 
their local currency budget instead, kyat that could be saved. Furthermore, the private 
sector is not permitted access to the foreign reserves, and there is segmentation of the 
foreign exchange market between the allocation system of the public sector and the de 
facto authorized parallel market. This encourages the accumulation of foreign exchange 
at the central bank. 
Regarding reform measures, by changing the budget allocation system within the 
public sector, the government could replace a part of the expenditure from the kyat 
budget with additional rationing from the foreign exchange budget, which would reduce 
the excess money supply. Also, more importantly, by removing the ban on foreign 
reserves for the private sector, the central bank can absorb excess kyat liquidity from the 
private sector. 
Concerning the private sector’s access to foreign reserves, restricting it to current 
account transactions would be a practical option in the Myanmar context. The simple 
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simulation performed in this study indicates that the private sector’s access to foreign 
reserves along with a 20 percent increase in the sector’s imports would stabilize the 
money supply. On the other hand, the experiences of developing countries suggest that 
capital account liberalization before fiscal consolidation encourages the private sector’s 
switch to foreign currency assets which aggravates inflation. Thus for Myanmar, the 
first step toward more effective use of its natural gas export revenue would be fiscal 
consolidation along with current account liberalization; this could be followed later by 
capital account liberalization. 
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FIGURE 1 
 Selected Indices of the Balance of Payments: 1996-2006 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Note: Data for 2007 and onwards are not available. 
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FIGURE 2 
 Foreign Reserves and Net Errors and Omissions: 1996-2008 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF, and IMF (various issues) 
Notes: “Foreign Exchange” refers to line 1d.d of the International Financial Statistics for 1996 
through 2006, and equivalent figures in IMF (various issues) for 2007 and 2008. “Changes in 
Foreign Exchange” and “Net Errors and Omissions of Balance of Payments” are based on line 
79dbd and line 78cad of the International Financial Statistics, respectively. 
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FIGURE 3 
 Fiscal Balance and Financing Methods: 1996/97 to 2007/08 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF, IMF (various issues), and Selected 
Monthly Economic Indicators, Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Myanmar. 
Notes: “Treasury Bonds” refers to the net sales of treasury bonds (total sales minus discharged). 
“Borrowing from Central Bank” is calculated as the balance between the central bank’s claims to the 
government as of the end of the current fiscal year compared with the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Amounts of fiscal deficit and financing do not necessarily match with each other partly due to 
changes in prices over each fiscal year. 
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FIGURE 4 
 Money Supply and Inflation: 1991/92 - 2008/09 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF. 
Notes: M2 stands for the sum of Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposits and Demand 
Deposits at deposit money banks, and Currency in Circulation. Inflation is the average 
twelve-month inflation rate.  
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TABLE 1 
 Balance Sheet of the Central Bank 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF. 
Notes: All figures are as of the end of the calendar year. (A) refers to conversion of Foreign Assets 
(net) from kyat to US dollar at the official exchange rate. (B) refers to re-conversion of (A) into kyat 
value at the prevailing parallel market exchange rate. 
2000 2006 2007 2008
Assets
　Foreign Assets (net) 763 6,535 12,595 19,197
　Claims on Central Government 447,581 2,762,630 3,534,690 3,880,760
　Claims on Deposit Money Banks 15,918 7,206 10,897 23,932
Sub Total 464,262 2,776,371 3,558,182 3,923,889
Liabilities
　Reserve Money 431,085 2,655,170 3,393,760 3,709,490
　Liabilities to Deposit Money Banks 23,847 29,876 35,462 40,800
　Other items (net) 4,047 52,436 68,579 81,889
Capital Account 5,282 38,882 60,382 91,715
Sub Total 464,261 2,776,364 3,558,183 3,923,893
Discrepancies 1 7 -1 -4
Official Exchange Rate (kyat/US dollar) 6.53034 5.65575 5.38424 5.52404
(A) Foreign Assets （net）　USD, million 117 1,155 2,339 3,475
Parallel Market Exchange Rate （kyat/US dollar） 431 1,264 1,280 1,207
(B) Foreign Assets (net) kyat, million 50,352 1,460,541 2,994,244 4,194,622
Kyat, million
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TABLE 2 
 Trade Balance by Ownership: 1996/97 - 2008/09 
 
Notes: The original data are reported in kyat. They are converted into US dollar at the official 
exchange rate. 
Source: Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, CSO. 
 
 
 
FY Imports Exports Imports Exports
of which
Natural Gas Imports Exports
1996 1,559 605 434 323 0 1,993 928
1997 1,645 770 663 266 0 2,309 1,036
1998 1,820 745 882 337 1 2,702 1,082
1999 1,833 1,109 773 325 5 2,605 1,433
2000 1,857 1,380 463 581 171 2,321 1,961
2001 1,777 1,333 958 1,216 632 2,734 2,549
2002 1,786 1,653 511 1,422 912 2,297 3,075
2003 1,532 1,308 703 1,048 580 2,235 2,356
2004 1,354 1,262 626 1,653 1,015 1,979 2,915
2005 1,368 1,603 614 1,951 1,073 1,982 3,554
2006 1,804 2,068 1,125 3,155 2,031 2,928 5,223
2007 2,443 2,369 903 4,044 2,532 3,347 6,413
2008 2,592 2,480 1,971 4,313 2,384 4,563 6,793
Private Sector Public Sector Total
US dollar, million
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TABLE 3 
 Simulation of the Impacts of Current Account Liberalization on the Money Supply 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF, and Selected Monthly Economic 
Indicators, CSO. 
Notes: Regarding (1) Actual 2007 at official rate, the change in foreign reserves (∆ܴ) is based on the 
change in the foreign assets (net) of the central bank’s balance sheet denominated in kyat (Kyat 
5,016 million), and converted into US dollar at the official exchange rate (5.1739 kyat/USD). The 
growth rate of money is calculated using the currency in circulated as of March 2008 (Kyat 2,394.7 
billion) as the denominator.  
Regarding (2) Actual 2007 at market rate, the prevailing parallel market rate as of March 2008 was 
1,111 kyat’s/USD. The fiscal balance in the kyat account was in deficit by (Kyat 641,550 million and 
+ Kyat 5,016 million) and that of the foreign currency account was in surplus by USD 1,094 million. 
The aggregated fiscal balance was in surplus by Kyat 568,868 million.  
 For Simulations (3) to (5), it is assumed that the trade deficit of the private sector reduces the 
change in foreign reserves by the same amount, and reduces the money supply proportionately. 
Change in
F. Reserve
Imports Exports Trade
 Balance
ΔR due to
FD
due to
ΔR
Total
change
Growth
rate
USD,million %
Actual 2007 at official rate 2,443 2,369 -74 1,094 641,550 5,016 646,566 27.0
Actual 2007 at market rate 2,443 2,369 -74 1,094 -568,868 1,215,434 646,566 27.0
10% increase in imports 2,687 2,369 -318 776 -568,868 861,803 292,935 12.2
20% increase in imports 2,932 2,369 -563 531 -568,868 590,385 21,517 0.9
30% increase in imports 3,176 2,369 -807 287 -568,868 318,968 -249,900 -10.4
Private Sector Trade
USD, million
Change in Money　Supply
kyat, million
